Originally Posted by
Ganchrow
One feature of this class of function is that they exhibit what's known as "constant relative risk aversion". This means that regardless of any increase or decrease in bankroll a player's aversion to risk (his dislike for outcome uncertainty) will remain unchanged when evaluating a given percentage change in bankroll (constant absolute risk aversion, on the other hand would correspond to equivalent aversion to risk for a given dollar change).
Putting it another way, if two individuals both exhibit isoelastic utility, each with the same α parameter, then each will treat an x% change in bankroll identically irrespective of their relative bankroll levels. In other words, if I have $10,000 to my name and you have a $1,000,000 then an additional $100 would increase my happiness by the same amount as an additional $10,000 would increase yours.
Now whether you agree with the above depiction or not is largely irrelevant. These are the utility functions implied by Kelly (with α representing the so-called "Kelly fraction") and if this depiction seems inapplicable to your personal preferences, then while that may well be a trait that you share with most human beings, it in no way implies the inefficacy of n-Kelly at maximizing the utility of a hypothetical individual whose preferences are in line with isoelastic utility.
As I alluded to earlier (and have mentioned countless times on this forum), one by-product of full-Kelly maximization is that it will also maximize the expected growth rate of a (still axiomatic) bankroll. This means that over an arbitrarily long stretch of time the probability that bankroll being bet with Kelly will be larger than a bankroll bet using some other strategy will approach certainty (100%)..
While this may be a by-product of isoelastic utility, it was nevertheless the precise and only effect intended by Kelly. Kelly didn't consider any of the other implications of this mode of thought, nor did he even consider its applicability. He simply made the a priori declaration that such a strategy was effectively preference-independent (I mean who wouldn't want to maximize bankroll growth? Duh.) Now that in no way is meant to marginalize the contributions of Dr. Kelly. The guy wasn't an economist --he just derived his results from the perspective of maximizing expected growth, rather than from the perspective of maximizing a broader class of utility function.
So really there are two schools of thought from which to consider Kelly:
1. the John L. Kelly/Bernoulli manner -- Kelly is the strategy maximizing the expected growth of a bankroll. Fractional Kelly, while not explicitly defined, can be considered the full-Kelly stake multiplied by the Kelly fraction. The fractional-Kelly stake may not be well-defined for all classes of bets, nor may all questions of Klely-optimality be easily answered.
2. the utility function manner -- Kelly is the strategy maximizing the utility function for a bettor with Kelly risk aversion parameter α. The fractional Kelly stake will always be well-defined for any class of bets, and in general, for small stakes, will closely mirror the fractional Kelly stake defined in 1) above. This methodology is readily extensible to include all forms of wealth manipulation.
So what I’m going to argue is that neither of these interpretations is consistent (in most cases) with an easily replenished bankroll.
In the Kelly/Bernoulli school the Ultimate Goal of Existence is getting as rich as possible as deliberately and as quickly as possible. Losing one's entire is infinitely bad (log(0) ~ -∞) because once one's bankroll drops to 0 it's impossible for it to grow ever again. It's not just bad, or very bad, or really bad, really really very very bad, but infinitely, no possible to do any worse than this, Book of Revelations bad. Now that's bad.